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The IHRA Definition of Antisemitism: Defining
Antisemitism by Erasing Palestinians
REBECCA RUTH GOULD
Abstract
The IHRA definition is one of the most contentious documents in the history of efforts to
combat antisemitism. Although it first became well known in the UK as a result of disputes
within the Labour Party, the definition reaches well beyond that context, and has been
adopted by universities, city councils, and governments. With its intensive focus on the cri-
tique of Israel as a marker of antisemitism, the IHRA definition has been heavily implicated
in the suppression of Israel-critical speech in recent years. This article is among the first to
adopt a global perspective on the definition—both its history and its content—clarifying the
political stakes of this definition and broader paratextual apparatus for a general audience,
and provides an explanation of why it should be rejected rather than used to censor Israel-
critical speech.
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THE INTERNATIONAL Holocaust Remembrance
Alliance (IHRA) definition of antisemitism—
here also called the working definition—is a
recently repurposed document that proposes
to define, or rather to redefine, antisemitism,
and to shape institutional responses to its
manifestations. Its significance lies less in its
content (which is not original) than in the
political uses to which it has been put in
recent years, which are invariably connected
with Israeli politics and policies. Although
not without precedent, these political uses
mark a new frontier in efforts to suppress
Israel-critical speech in terms of their manner
of operation—the act of redefinition—and
their effectiveness.
In order to best assess the working defini-
tion’s impact, we should consider what
exactly it is, lexically, in terms of its content,
and historically, as a response to the chang-
ing meaning of antisemitism. To begin with
the lexical dimension: the IHRA definition is
a thirty-eight word statement about antise-
mitism that has come to be associated with
the intergovernmental International Holo-
caust Remembrance Alliance. This statement
defines antisemitism as ‘a certain perception
of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred
toward Jews’. This definition is followed by
eleven examples, which are said to ‘serve as
illustrations’. Seven of these highlight critical
statements and assessments of Israel as
markers of antisemitism.1 The extent to
which these examples belong to the defini-
tion proper is disputed.
The basic text for this definition originates
in an earlier context and in a different guise,
as a ‘non-legally binding working definition’
that was briefly published on the website of
the Vienna-based EU agency European Mon-
itoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia
(EUMC) in 2005. The main drafter for this
working definition is Kenneth Stern, an
American defence attorney who has vocally
opposed recent deployments of the definition
and accompanying examples in university
and other contexts to censor Israel-critical
speech.2 The EUMC definition is fundamen-
tally the same as the IHRA definition; the
only difference is the order of the examples.
The working definition was removed from
the EUMC website in 2013. It resurfaced
under a new name with the creation of the
International Holocaust Remembrance Alli-
ance, an organisation founded in 1998 with
thirty-one member states and a rotating
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chairmanship among its country members.
The working definition was first presented
to the world under the IHRA imprimatur on
26 May 2016, in the form of a press release
issued in Bucharest by the Romanian chair-
manship. This history means that the
denomination ‘IHRA definition’ is somewhat
misleading; the definition was formulated
before the IHRA was founded and it was
not immediately embraced by this organisa-
tion. Arguably, the rebranding served as a
kind of mystification, helping to obscure its
illegitimate foundations.
Although the press release included the
same eleven examples recycled from the ear-
lier EUMC version, in this document the
examples are set apart from the definition
adopted by the plenary in Bucharest. This
format suggests that the eleven examples
were not originally understood to be part of
the working definition itself, even though
much subsequent media coverage and com-
mentary has treated them as an intrinsic part
of the definition. The distinction between the
definition and the examples matters because
the latter have proven to be more divisive
than the definition, although both have been
criticised owing to their imprecision and
internal contradictions. Adoption of the defi-
nition has sometimes occurred without the
adoption of the eleven examples, such as in
the UK Labour Party’s early deliberations in
July 2018 (although the Labour Party eventu-
ally changed its position and adopted the
eleven examples two months later).
The working definition was first formu-
lated in the early 2000s, partly in response to
what has been referred to as the ‘new antise-
mitism’, a term that emerged in the 1960s
and 1970s in the writings of French philoso-
pher Pierre-Andre Taguieff, and US groups
such as the American Jewish Congress and
the Anti-Defamation League. According to
its critics, the ‘new antisemitism’ is a form of
antisemitism that is emerging on the left and
which is closely linked to anti-Zionism and
criticism of Israeli policies. Those who coined
this term consider the ‘new antisemitism’
more dangerous than so-called classical anti-
semitism, because it is more popular among
leftist groups that have traditionally been
well-represented among intellectuals.
Along with this ideological context that led
to the creation of the working definition, there
is an empirical one: over half a century after
the Holocaust, antisemitic incidents, including
arsons of synagogues, and in some cases mur-
der, continue to proliferate in Europe. The
murder of two elderly Jewish women in
France in 2017 and 2018, and the increasing
popularity of parties with historical ties to the
Nazis across Europe (particularly in Austria
where a political party with a Nazi heritage
has become the ruling party), have rightly
focussed Europe’s attention on this issue.3
There is a clear need for a coordinated institu-
tional response to hate crimes involving anti-
semitism, as well as other forms of racism.
According to its lead author Kenneth Stern,
the main purpose in creating the definition was
data classification: police needed this tool in
order to classify antisemitic crimes as hate
crimes. Although hate crime legislation was
well developed in the countries where the
working definition took hold, there was no
widely accepted approach to classifying—
let alone prosecuting—antisemitic crimes as
hate crimes. Some maintain that the penalisa-
tion of antisemitism was encompassed by exist-
ing hate crime legislation, such as, in the UK
context, the Race Relations Act (1965) and the
Public Order Act (1986). Others, noting that
Jews face forms of discrimination unlike those
faced by other ethnic minorities, have argued
for the need for a distinctive approach by the
state and public institutions for combating anti-
semitism—one that differs from the approach
used to document and prosecute racism.
As of May 2020, the working definition has
been adopted by twenty-five countries,
including the UK, Germany, Belgium, Swe-
den, and Italy. Notably, several IHRA mem-
ber countries have not adopted the definition.
It has not been adopted by any Arab or Mid-
dle Eastern country other than Israel, by any
country in Latin America other than Uru-
guay, or by any country in Asia or Africa.
The definition therefore predominates mostly
in Europe, Eastern Europe, and North Amer-
ica (although it has not been adopted by the
United States). In many countries where the
definition has not been adopted by the state,
it has nonetheless been incorporated into the
internal policies of governmental institutions
and agencies within that state, such as the US
State Department and the US Department of
Education. More locally, city councils, univer-
sities, media organisations, political parties,
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and charities have followed suit and
‘adopted’ the definition.
Every instance of the working definition’s
adoption has taken place in the absence of a
clear consensus regarding what ‘adoption’
actually means. Does it compel a university
to discipline or fire staff who are deemed to
be in violation of the definition? Does it
legitimate the censorship of controversial
publications, or make texts that are deemed
to violate the definition or conform to its
examples illegal? Can a violation of the defi-
nition lead to incarceration or civil penalties?
In legal terms, the answer to all these ques-
tions is currently no, insofar as the jurisdic-
tion in question abides by democratic
norms. Even proponents of the working def-
inition note that ‘It was not designed to be
transposed into European or domestic legis-
lation’.4 However, when offered as a demon-
stration that adoption poses no risks, such
assurances are misleading, given that many
of the definition’s proponents have
attempted to ascribe legal force to its
deployment. Others have treated the work-
ing definition as if it had legal force through
a kind of automatic reflex, as for example
when the IHRA definition was adopted by
the French Parliament in December 2019 in
the form of a resolution, and this was
widely reported in the media as if it marked
a change in the law.5 It is precisely with
respect to the difficult-to-determine bound-
aries between the legal and the non-legal
that the IHRA definition poses the greatest
risks. Its capacity to motivate authorities to
censor Israel-critical speech is linked to the
imprecision of its legal status.
It is striking that, although the IHRA defi-
nition is merely a policy document, with no
formal legal status, this non-legally binding
definition is treated as if it had the capacity
to render antisemitism extinct through crimi-
nal sanctions. In no context has the meaning
of ‘adoption’ been adequately defined. Geof-
frey Bindman, one of the UK’s leading voices
in civil rights jurisprudence, has clarified that,
in the context of the working definition,
‘“adopting” seems to mean no more than
encouraging its use. [The definition] continues
to have no legal effect’.6 Another eminent jur-
ist, Hugh Tomlinson, has gone so far as to
suggest that universities that apply the defini-
tion to censor Israel-critical speech may find
themselves in breach of UK and EU laws per-
taining to academic freedom.7 These legal
assessments are among the few that clearly
delineate what ‘adoption’ entails in practical
terms. Predictably, the position taken regard-
ing the meaning and status of ‘adoption’
tends to be linked to an individual’s position
as regards the critique of Israel.
Alongside its contradictory content, one of
the many peculiarities of the definition is the
ambiguity of its legal status. The precise pur-
pose of the definition is far from transparent.
Neither the definition nor the accompanying
examples explicitly advocate for the censor-
ship of Israel-critical speech, yet the chilling
of speech has been its widespread effect. It
describes itself as a ‘legally non-binding
working definition’, yet this apparent caveat
has turned out to be more of an evasion in
practice. Since there are few, if any, prece-
dents for such a quasi-legal document in the
context of defining racism, the meaning of
both ‘legally non-binding’ and ‘working defi-
nition’ have had to be determined in practice.
This trial-and-error approach has resulted,
predictably, in numerous errors, false accusa-
tions, and instances of censorship.
Although the IHRA press release stipu-
lates that ‘criticism of Israel similar to that
levelled against any other country cannot be
regarded as antisemitic’, there are no effec-
tive checks in place, either within the docu-
ment or within its paratextual apparatus, to
prevent its abusive application. If anything,
the need for a coherent institutional
approach to antisemitism in Europe has
increased since the development of the
working definition in the 2000s. Yet, the
most lethal manifestations of antisemitism in
Europe—the ones that would be categorised
as hate crimes—are associated with right-
wing fascist movements, not with the leftist
political campaigning targeted by the exam-
ples appended to the working definition.
Having considered the history of the
IHRA definition, let us turn to its recent
deployments. In every context in which it
has been adopted or applied, the working
definition has faced sharp criticism. Scholars
of Jewish and Holocaust studies have played
a prominent role in exposing its shortcom-
ings. Numerous open letters have been
addressed to the parliaments of Germany
and France and to city councils, opposing
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the adoption of the definition. While these
public and principled denunciations have
drawn the world’s attention to the working
definition’s flaws, they have not been suc-
cessful to-date in stopping the abusive appli-
cation of the definition or in addressing its
harmful effects. The limited impact of these
interventions suggests the need for a more
coordinated effort, a more global perspective,
and for education as well as protest, that
would clarify the implications of the work-
ing definition of antisemitism for Palestinians
as well as for Jews, and clarify the ways in
which the implementation of this document
is linked to the geopolitical context of the
Palestinian occupation.
In a recent expert opinion of the IHRA defi-
nition commissioned by the Rosa Luxemburg
Foundation, German sociologist Peter Ullrich
has documented how the weaknesses of the
‘working definition’ have served as the ‘gate-
way to its political instrumentalization, for
instance for morally discrediting opposing
positions in the Arab-Israeli conflict with the
accusation of antisemitism’.8 As a document
that abounds in unhelpful tautologies (‘Anti-
semitism is a certain perception of Jews’),
which singles out as potentially antisemitic
patterns of thought (for example, ‘double
standards’) that have no necessary correlation
with antisemitism, and abounds in caveats
(‘may serve’, ‘non-legally binding’, ‘taking
into account the overall context’) that obscure
the status of its own stipulations, the working
definition appears in many respects to be a
document that is uniquely suited to generate
misunderstanding, misapplications and, ulti-
mately, abuses of its stated intent. In brief, the
IHRA definition intervenes in public dis-
course by way of obfuscation.
Having discussed the history of the defini-
tion and its misapplications in a general
European context, we must now consider
what the definition means for Palestinians.
Why should Palestinians care about the
working definition? What is at stake for
them in this debate? From the perspective of
Palestinian rights, the most problematic part
of the document is the seventh example of
antisemitism: ‘Denying the Jewish people
their right to self-determination, e.g., by
claiming that the existence of a State of Israel
is a racist endeavour.’ This example includes
two loaded phrases that bear much of the
political weight of this contentious docu-
ment: ‘self-determination’ and ‘racist endeav-
our’. The first term problematically ignores
the many legitimate non-antisemitic reasons
for ‘denying’ self-determination to Jews and
others, such as an aversion to nationalism.
The second claim, that the characterisation of
a State of Israel as ‘a racist endeavour’ could
be an example of antisemitism, misses a cru-
cial aspect of the adjudication of antisemit-
ism: while it is certainly conceivable that
antisemitism could coexist with such a state-
ment, there is no evidence of any necessary
link. This example does not assist in identify-
ing antisemitism, because it is not per se anti-
semitic to call Israel a racist endeavour.
Curiously for a definition of antisemitism,
the only reference to racism in the working
definition, or its accompanying examples, is
the allusion to a description of Israel as a
‘racist endeavour’ as an example of antise-
mitism. While the IHRA’s 2016 press release
did associate antisemitism with xenophobia,
a serious consideration of antisemitism
within the context of racism was absent from
that document as well. This isolated
approach to antisemitism, which treats it as
a problem in isolation from broader social
issues, has the further effect of shielding
Israel from criticism and deflecting discus-
sion away from antisemitism’s social origins.
While the IHRA document is marked
throughout by an effort to separate racism
from antisemitism, other definitions of anti-
semitism, such as that proposed by Indepen-
dent Jewish Voices (IJV) of Canada, an
organisation that has outspokenly opposed
the working definition, contextualise antise-
mitism as a kind of racism. The IJV Canada
definition states: ‘antisemitism is not an
exceptional form of bigotry. People who
hate, discriminate and/or attack Jews, will
also hate, discriminate and/or attack other
protected groups—including racialized peo-
ple, Muslims, LGBTQ2+, women, Indigenous
peoples.’9 David Feldman, director of the
Pears Institute for the Study of Antisemitism
at Birkbeck, University of London, argued
along similar lines soon after the UK govern-
ment’s adoption of the IHRA definition in
December 2016. According to Feldman, ‘the
greatest flaw of the IHRA definition is its
failure to make any ethical and political con-
nections between the struggle against
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antisemitism and other sorts of prejudice’.10
Feldman’s critique of the working definition
is distinguished by his abiding interest in
integrating the study of antisemitism into a
broader understanding of racism.
Feldman’s critique, articulated within days
of the first adoption of the definition by a
state, proved prophetic, and not only for the
UK, but for every country that has adopted it
since. As vice-chair to the Labour Party’s 2016
inquiry on antisemitism, Feldman was well-
positioned to foresee the likely consequences
of the adoption at a time when few were
awake to its implications. Feldman’s prescient
warning that adoption by the UK ‘will place
the onus on Israel’s critics to demonstrate they
are not antisemitic’ has been demonstrated
many times over in subsequent years. In the
UK, to mention just one of the widely
reported examples, a charity event in aid of
Palestinian children was cancelled owing to a
London council’s fear of breaching the IHRA
definition guidelines.11 Universities have been
particularly affected: an Israel-critical event
pertaining to Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions
(BDS) was cancelled at the University of Cen-
tral Lancashire; at the University of Exeter,
students were banned from staging a street
theatre performance during Israel Apartheid
Week in 2017; at the University of Manch-
ester, the title of a talk was changed so as to
avoid criticism of Israel.
In the US, Donald Trump’s executive
order directing government agencies to con-
sider the IHRA definition, signed on Decem-
ber 2019, immediately resulted in three
complaints filed with the Department of
Education targeting Palestine advocacy on
university campuses.12 In Germany, Jewish
Voice for Peace had its bank account closed
following the government’s adoption of the
definition in May 2019, and American rapper
Talib Kweli had his scheduled performance
at a music festival in Dusseldorf cancelled
because of his refusal to denounce BDS.
These are just a few of countless examples,
many of which have been documented by
the UK-based group Free Speech on Israel,
the US-based Palestine Legal, and in a letter
from the Palestinian Human Rights Organi-
zations Council to the UN’s Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights
(OHCHR).13 All of these incidents followed
from the working definition’s adoption in
their respective jurisdictions and have con-
tributed to a general climate of fear and
intimidation for activists on Palestinian
issues, and made the open discussion of
Israel’s violations of international law and
Palestinian human rights even more chal-
lenging.
As the preceding examples suggest, the
IHRA definition has been implicated in
numerous free speech violations around the
world, among Palestinians and pro-Pales-
tinian activists. It has also been used to silence
and defame many Jews critical of Zionism. A
climate of fear and self-censorship has come
to dominate many European and North
American universities as a result of the
increasing authority wielded by this defini-
tion. In a few short years, by rebranding itself
and changing the order of its examples, the
working definition of antisemitism has gone
from being an obscure document known to
few people, to a game-changing instrument of
policy and an effective tool of censorship that
functions in many contexts like a piece of leg-
islation, with major implications for discus-
sions of Israeli politics. Although it originated
as a document intended for internal use by
the police and community organisations, the
working definition has become a tool of for-
eign policy by proxy, enabling those who
wish to censor and suppress open discussion
of Israel’s occupation to do so with the halo of
legitimacy.
I will conclude here with three recommen-
dations for those wishing to mitigate the per-
nicious effects of the definition and to support
the struggle for justice for Palestinians. First,
we need a global perspective on the impact of
the working definition. Although resistance to
it may be most effective at the local level, it is
important to track its effects in a global con-
text. Viewing the damage wrought by this
document solely from the perspective of
domestic British, US, German, or French poli-
tics is unhelpfully myopic, given the intercon-
nectedness of these developments. Although
European countries are currently battle-
grounds for the definition’s application, they
are not, in and of themselves, the actual sites
of the conflict. Without Israel’s violations of
international law and Palestinians’ human
rights, there would be much less controversy
over the definition, and much less motivation
to censor and suppress Israel-critical dissent.
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Rightly understood, the controversy over the
definition is inseparable from what is taking
place in Israel and Palestine. It is a mistake to
seek to separate out these issues entirely.
While antisemitism should be considered as a
problem in its own right and without refer-
ence to Israel, the working definition does not
permit this.
My second and related recommendation is
that any discussion of the definition or exami-
nation of its impact should be integrated with
an educational programme relating to Pales-
tine. In contexts where the definition has been
adopted and it is impractical to expect its
annulment, the definition’s exclusionary focus
on Israel should be counterbalanced by an
expanded focus on the ongoing human rights
struggle in Palestine, and on the many domes-
tic and international developments that stand
in the way of this struggle. Palestinians can
assist in these efforts by making their demands
clear, as the ten-member organisation of the
Palestinian Human Rights Organizations
Council has already done in their open letter to
OHCHR. Similar open letters and public calls
could be addressed to the European Parlia-
ment, to governments contemplating adopting
the definition, and to universities and to uni-
versity-related organisations. Even when
proposing new definitions is impractical or
undesirable, it is important to document the
damage done by the existing definition.
Finally, alongside a more global perspective
and greater attention to Palestinian voices
and Palestinian rights, the working defini-
tion’s failure to stop or even to reduce antise-
mitism in the jurisdictions where it has been
adopted shows that we need a new approach
to understanding antisemitism that looks
beyond the fashionable if tendentious cliches
associated with the ‘new antisemitism’.
Although it is distinct from other kinds of
racism, antisemitism is best understood as a
kind of racism. The categories of xenophobia
and prejudice are inadequate to understand-
ing the roots of Jewish persecution, especially
in Europe. Antisemitism studies could learn a
great deal from examining how oppressed
peoples of other backgrounds have found lan-
guages for documenting their marginalisation
and exclusion from society. A postcolonial
and anti-racist working understanding of
antisemitism would look radically unlike the
one that dominates public discourse today.
In their recent article for this journal, Ben
Gidley, Brendan McGeever and David Feld-
man have also called for moving away from a
purely legal approach to the problem of antise-
mitism. Noting that ‘You can expel antise-
mites, but you cannot expel antisemitism’, the
authors document the many deficiencies of
current approaches to this issue, which tend to
be dominated by the search for legal defini-
tions, as if the mere adoption of a censorious
definition could offer a failsafe solution. ‘The
number of antisemites is not the same thing as
the spread of antisemitic ideas’, the authors
rightly note, and suggest that instead, of con-
ceiving of antisemitism as a virus, we under-
stand it, and any systematic and persistent
racism, as ‘a deep reservoir of stereotypes and
narratives, one which is replenished over time
and from which people can draw with ease’.
Their account of the recent controversy around
antisemitism within the Labour Party supports
the view advanced here that the IHRA defini-
tion is ineffective as a means of combating anti-
semitism precisely because it is entrenched in
the viral mentality that locates antisemitism in
individual culpability rather than in a broader
social justice framework.14
In seeking to develop a global perspective
on the IHRA definition, we may reasonably
ask to what extent such a seemingly innocu-
ous, even banal, document may be relevant to
the course of future politics pertaining to
Israel/Palestine. On one level, it is merely a
set of words, the implications of which
depend on the user and the context. At the
same time, given the contentious context of
Palestine/Israel in international politics, the
definition operates with a predetermined sig-
nificance in every jurisdiction that adopts it.
Owing to its wording, its choice of examples,
and its imprecision, this document is danger-
ously adept at quashing dissent, and in con-
straining activist agendas that seek justice for
Palestinians. The working definition is at once
a proxy for, and a symptom of, a range of
issues, including the failure of international
law to hold Israel accountable for its crimes,
the ineffectiveness and/or indifference of
international law towards the ongoing occu-
pation of Palestine, and the unresolved lega-
cies of the Holocaust. All of these issues are
entangled into the working definition, and
help to account for the speed with which it
has been adopted across Europe and North
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America without adequate scrutiny or demo-
cratic deliberation. They also explain its effec-
tiveness as a weapon to silence dissent.
Finally, the working definition is also a testi-
mony to the power of language—when
endowed with quasi-legal status—to reshape
the reality of observers and to prevent those
who are touched by it from protesting the occu-
pation of Palestine. With its ambiguous exam-
ples that use one tragedy to obscure another,
this is a definition that operates through era-
sure: of Palestinians and their claims to self-de-
termination, which are continuously under
threat by the Israeli occupation, and of the fun-
damental human right to protest actions taken
by any state. From its inception in 2003 to the
present, no proponent of the working definition
has been able to reconcile its exclusionary
claims with fundamental human rights, to inte-
grate it into a programmatic anti-racist agenda,
or to use it to facilitate Jewish and Palestinian
coexistence in the occupied territories. While
rejecting this definition, we should replace it
with a different understanding, not just of anti-
Jewish racism, but of the relation between law
and social justice.
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